Abstract. The SecureSCM project (www.securescm.org) aims to develop cryptographic solutions to the problem of data sharing in Supply Chain Optimization (SCO). The SCO problem has a precise mathematical structure. It is an instance of the general Linear Programming (LP) problem. However, standard techniques for LP problems are not suitable for this purpose because they require participants to reveal private data needed as input to the algorithm. The risk of revealing this information far exceeds the benefits gained. Therefore, the aim of the project is to develop efficient techniques for securely solving LP problems. In this paper we give a summary of work done in the cryptographic aspects of the project. We describe the state-of-the art building blocks for secure linear programming along with an analysis of their complexity.
Introduction
Consider the dining cryptographers' problem [2] : three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favorite restaurant when their waiter informs them that arrangements have been made with the maitre d'hotel for the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryptographers might be paying for the dinner, or it might have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The three cryptographers respect each other's right to make an anonymous payment, but they would like to be sure of which side is paying. They decide to solve their problem as follows: each cryptographer mentally decides a secret bit -0 if (s)he paid and 1 if (s)he did not. Then they follow a protocol to compute the AND of these bits without revealing their secret bits and reveal the result (from which they solve their problem). The above strategy is secure assuming they use a protocol that computes the (public) AND of secret bits but reveals absolutely no information about the secret bits. Such a protocol is said to be privacy-preserving or secure. Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a distributed computation using a protocol constructed from such privacy-preserving building blocks.
Problem Definition: Our target SMC problem involves some n parties with n ≥ 3. An LP problem in standard or canonical form (depending on the algorithm used) is given. The various values defining the constraints and the objective function are the data to be protected. A mathematical description of an LP problem is given in Section 3.
We follow the general model of a threshold adversary structure, where the adversary can corrupt up to t parties. The value t is called the corruption threshold (or simply the threshold). For simplicity we only consider passive corruptions. We refer the reader to [9] for these concepts. Complexity Metrics Complexity is measured for three quantities. These are:
-Data Transmitted: To measure this, we use a metric called an invocation.
An invocation is the amount of data transmitted when every party transmits to every other party an element of a finite field Z q . -Communication Time: To measure this, we call this unit a round.
A round is the time needed for one invocation. If a protocol step requires two or more invocations that can be done in parallel, then that step still counts as only 1 round of time. On the other hand, if two or more invocations in a step cannot be done in parallel, then each such invocation adds one more round to the protocol. -Local Computation: This defines the amount of computation done by each party locally in order to prepare and process data of invocations. In practice, addition and multiplication are fast enough to be discarded from analysis. The only expensive operation is field exponentiation. Therefore, our basic unit of measuring local computation is an exponentiation.
Secret Sharing
Notation: The symbol a → i denotes that value a is sent to party (or set of parties) represented by i over a secure channel. The symbol (a 1 , a 2 , . . .
Shamir's Secret Sharing The basic framework we use is that of Shamir secret sharing [11, 1] . In this framework, each party holds one share of the secret and a threshold number of parties must pool their shares in order to obtain the secret. The protocol is defined using the following parameters: an integer n ≥ 2 (denoting the number of parties), an integer t < n denoting a threshold (maximum number of parties the adversary can corrupt) and a finite field Z q .
Share generation:
The secret s is an element of some finite field Z q . Uniformly select t field elements a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ∈ Z q . Then construct a degree-t polynomial p(
and compute s i = p(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The n-vector (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) is called a sharing of s. Denote by RandShare(s, n, t) a function computing a sharing of s.
.n] with |J| = t + 1 and reconstruct secret s as: s = j∈J s j i∈J,i =j
In the remainder of this paper, the symbol [s] denotes a Shamir sharing of s.
Replicated Secret Sharing (RSS): See [3] for details. Using previous notation, let A = {X|X ⊂ [1.
.n] ∧ |X| = t} be the set of all maximal unqualified subsets of parties (note: |A| = n t = n! (n−t)!t! ).
RQ = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r |A| ) is a sharing of s. 2. Share Distribution: Assign an arbitrary labeling to A as {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X |A| }.
Then distribute the shares as:
.n] such that |B| = t+1. Then members of B jointly share the entire vector (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r |A| ). They compute s = |A| i=1 r i .
SMC Framework
We describe some building blocks based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Let q ≡ 3 (mod 4) be a prime. We consider secrets to be elements of Z q that are (t, n)-Shamir shared for t, n ∈ Z + . We further require n ≥ 3 and t < n/2. These protocols are standard in the literature and provide perfect security [12, 1] . 
Data Representation: Every field Z q consists of the additive and multiplicative identities, 0 and 1 respectively. These can be used to encode the boolean variables T rue and F alse respectively. Integers in the range [−2 ℓ ..2 ℓ − 1] will be represented as elements of a prime field Z q such that q > 2 ℓ+1 . For some integer α in the range, the corresponding field element representation is α mod q. 
Complexity: Appendix B gives the complexity of the above protocols. 
Other Building Blocks
. . , r |A| ) be an RSS master sharing over Z q . Let H : Z q ×Z + × → Z q be a PRF with keys and outputs in Z q , and inputs in Z + . 
each element of f i is linearly independent of the others (because they are of different degree); and |f i | = t. Thus, f i is a basis of F i .
(B) Random RSS sharing: Protocol 2.5 generates a random RSS sharing [3] .
Protocol 2.5: [s]
RQ ← RandRSS() 
10 (E) Multiplication of secrets with public output: Party i ∈ [1..n] holds a i , b i , the shares of a, b ∈ Z q . They follow Protocol 2.8:
6 return c; , r 2 , . . . , r |A| ) be an RSS master sharing. Let
static ctr ← 0; // static used as in C language 
Assuming that one evaluation of ⊙ takes α rounds and β invocations, Protocol 2.12 computes
, while Protocol 2.13 computes the prefix in O(log(k))α rounds. For simplicity k is assumed to be a power of 2.
Protocol 2.13:
The above protocols can be used for any associative operation. They provide perfect privacy if the operation is evaluated with perfect privacy. The protocols are based on well known techniques from computer arithmetic [4] and parallel algorithms [5] . The protocols can easily be adapted to any k. The complexity is given in Appendix B. We next need a protocol for carry-out in binary addition.
Carry propagation in binary addition: Let a = (a k , . . . , a 1 ) and b = (b k , . . . , b 1 ) the two integer inputs, p i = a i ⊕ b i the carry propagation bit and g i = a i ∧ b i the carry generation bit, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The carry bits can be computed as:
Define an operator:
2 . This operator can be rewritten as •(p 1 , g 1 , p 2 , g 2 ) = (p 1 p 2 , g 2 + p 2 g 1 ) and can be computed in 1 round and 2 invocations. 
Protocol 2.16: [s]
← LTZ([a], k) [b] ← 2 k−1 + [a]; 1 foreach i ∈ [0..k − 2] do parallel 2 [r i ] ← RandBit(q); // 1 rnd, k − 1 inv, k − 1 exp 3 [r ′ ] B ← ([r k−2 ], . . . , [r 0 ]); 4 [r ′ ] ← k−2 i=0 2 i · [r i ]; 5 [r ′′ ] ← RandInt(κ + 1); 6 [r] ← 2 k−1 · [r ′′ ] + [r ′ ]; 7 c ← Reveal([b] + [r]); // 1 rnd, 1 inv 8 c ′ ← c mod 2 k−1 ; 9 [u] ← BitLT(c ′ , [r ′ ] B ); // log(k − 1) rnd, 2k − 4 inv 10 [b ′ ] ← c ′ − [r ′ ] + [u] · 2 k−1 ; 11 [s] ← ([a] − [b ′ ])(2 1−k mod q); 12 return [s];
.).
The following protocols are from [12] . .
Complexity: Appendix B gives the complexity of above protocols. Correctness: We refer to [10, 12, 1, 3] for the correctness of above protocols.
Secure Linear Programming
A linear programming (LP) maximization problem in standard form [6] consists of n non-negative variables x j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) and m constraints n j=1 a i,j · x j ≤ b i for (1 ≤ i ≤ m). The goal is to maximize an objective function n j=1 f j ·x j where f j , a i,j , b i , x j ∈ R and b i , x j ≥ 0. (note that n is not the number of parties). The most suitable algorithm for our purpose is Simplex [6, 7] . The algorithm is given in Appendix A. Compared to the method of [12] , we use a variant with (m + 1) × (n + 1) matrix T instead of (m + 1) × (m + n + 1). Secondly, we use a more efficient method for selecting the pivot row.
Secure Simplex: Protocol 3.1 implements the iteration of Simplex. The input to the protocol, [T ] is a (m + 1) × (n + 1) matrix representing the matrices A, B, F, Z as defined above. The matrix [T ] is assumed to exist in the system.
// see Table 1 1 Table 1 4 Table 1 8 
Protocol 3.3 outputs 0 if the bitmask V contains all zeros. [12] . The constraint comparison protocol, CompCons is adapted from [12] with optimizations in Steps 3 and 4.
4 // C * = copy of C with non-app entries set to zero
5
// B * = copy of B with non-app entries set to non-zero
The reader is referred to [12] for the rationale behind Protocols 3.5 and 3.6.
Protocol 3.7 updates the tableau T after the pivot has been selected.
Finally, Protocol 3.8 updates the vectors S, U (representing the basis and co-basis variables respectively) to reflect the new basis/co-basis. 
Correctness: All the building blocks we use are build using standard protocols in the literature. The correctness of most of them is trivial to verify. Due to lack of space, we do not prove correctness of the remaining protocols. Instead we refer the reader to the literature [9, 8, 10, 12, 1, 3] . The missing details will be provided in a full version of this paper.
Security: Protocols LTZ and GTZ provide statistical security in some parameter κ, with an overhead of κ bits. For typical situations κ ≥ 32 should be sufficient, which roughly amounts to ≤ 2 −κ probability of information leakage. The remaining protocols provide perfect security.
Complexity: Table 1 gives the complexity of the secure Simplex protocols of this section. The work of [12] is based on similar techniques. However, only asymptotic complexity bounds are presented there. Consequently, it is not possible to make a rigorous comparison between the two protocols. However, due to various improvements over the methods of [12] , the actual complexity of our protocol is much better.
Protocol Rounds
Invocations Exp. Null 1 1 0 GetPivCol 2 + log(k − 1) + log n 2kn + n 2 log n n(k − 1) GetPivRow log(8m 5 ) + log(k − 1)(log 2m) 6m(k + 1) 2m(k − 1) UpdTab 5 4mn + 7m + 4n + 4 0 UpdVar 2 2m + 2 0 Table 1 . Complexity of operations in secure Simplex protocol.
Conclusion
We presented a summary of state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving building blocks that can be used to construct a secure Simplex protocol for solving linear programming problems in a restricted form (i.e., maximization problem in standard form). The protocols presented in this paper are adapted from the literature with several optimizations. As of now the only other secure protocol for simplex with a provable guarantee of security is proposed in [12] . The protocol presented here is more efficient than that of [12] because of the following optimizations: (1) use of a smaller tableau (i.e., (m+1)×(n+1) matrix instead of (m+1)×(m+n+1)), (2) avoidance of Bland's rule, (3) use of a faster CompCons protocol, and (4) use of a faster comparison protocol (LTZ). A detailed description of this work will appear in a full version of this paper. Similar to [12] , we use the integer-pivoting (IP) variant of Simplex [7] which has the advantage of providing an exact solution. Furthermore, privacy-preserving building-blocks for secure IP simplex already exist in the literature. On the other hand, the problem with IP Simplex is that the values in the tableau increase very rapidly in size. Due to this, we must use quite a large value of q (e.g., 1024 bits for typical problems) which becomes a communication bottleneck. A theoretical upper-bound on the values is given in [12] . However, this bound is not tight. As further work, we would like to explore the use of fixed-point Simplex (instead of IP Simplex) in order to avoid this rapid increase. Another open problem is to find faster variants of protocols for generating secret random bits and comparison.
